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TO INDICT OR NOT TO INDICT:
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
IN SHERMAN ACT ENFORCEMENT*
Donald L Bakert
The Sherman Act is indeed "the Magna Carta of free en-
terprise"-a statute famed for its breadth and brevity. The recent
removal of the "fair trade" provisos2 restored section 1 to its origi-
nal simplicity: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be il-
legal.' 13
Despite its brevity, section 1 in fact functions as two statutes.
One is a criminal statute dealing with hard-core violations-price
fixing, market allocation, and similar conduct-complete with a set
of strengthened felony sanctions added in 1974.4 The second stat-
ute-the other section 1-is a civil statute of extraordinary breadth
and flexibility; it invites the judiciary to develop creative equitable
remedies responsive to changing restraints in a changing econ-
omy. 5
* This Article is based on a speech made by the author before the Antitrust Law Brief-
ing Conference on February 28, 1977. Professor Baker gratefully acknowledges the assis-
tance of his former Special Assistant, Barbara A. Reeves of the California Bar, in prepar-
ing the original speech. © Copyright 1978, Donald I. Baker.
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1957, Princeton University; B.A. in Law
1959, Cambridge University; LL.B. 1961, Harvard University. From August 1976 to May
1977 the author served as Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice.
' United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
2See Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. V 1975)).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
4 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. V 1975)).
' As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions. It does not
go into detailed definitions which might either work injury to legitimate enterprise
or through particularization defeat its purposes by providing loopholes for escape.
The restrictions the Act imposes are not mechanical or artificial. Its general
phrases, interpreted to attain its fundamental objects, set up the essential standard
of reasonableness.
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
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This Article focuses on the line dividing the two statutes-the
line that determines when the Antitrust Division brings only a civil
case and when it brings a criminal case.6 As Justice Holmes was so
fond of noting, whenever a legal distinction is made between two
extremes, a line must be drawn to mark where the change takes
place.7 However, as Justice Frankfurter was equally fond of point-
ing out, "the fact that a line has to be drawn somewhere does not
justify its being drawn anywhere."8 This Article identifies where
the line between criminal indictment and civil complaint was drawn
while I headed the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and
explains why I think it should be drawn there.9
We all know what a plain, old-fashioned criminal case looks
like. When competitors meet in a smoke-filled hotel room and
agree on prices for future sales, they run foursquare into the
Sherman Act's clear criminal prohibition of horizontal price fix-
ing. 10 There is nothing new about either price fixing or its per
se status. Adam Smith observed in 1776 that most meetings of
businessmen end up by their reaching agreement on prices." The
' The Antitrust Division normally. files a companion civil case with any indictment
against conduct which has not clearly terminated. Such civil cases seldom have great practi-
cal importance because they lead only to an injunction restating the per se rule in the
context of the particular industry. What the Antitrust Division does not do is file a civil
case, without obtaining a criminal indictment, against hard-core conduct (such as price
fixing) where the Government's evidence is weak. In other words, the Division has no
intermediate category for cases where it can prove its case by a "preponderance of the
evidence," but not "beyond a reasonable doubt." If it does not think it can meet the "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for hard-core conduct, the Justice Department simply
does not bring the case.
7 "Where are you going to draw the line?-as if all life were not the marking of grades
between black and white." 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 331 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
8 Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543, 558 (1942) (dissenting opinion, Frankfurter,
J.). Justice Holmes himself made essentially the same point many years earlier:
I am the last man in the world to quarrel with a distinction simply because it is
one of degree. Most distinctions, in my opinion, are of that sort, and are none the
worse for it. But the line which is drawn must be justified by the fact that it is a
little nearer than the nearest opposing case to one pole of an admitted antithesis.
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 631-32 (1906) (dissenting opinion).
9 My standards for drawing the line appear to be substantially the same as those of my
predecessor, Thomas E. Kauper, and those of my successor, John H. Shenefield. Accord-
ingly, I believe this Article describes the modern practice in the Antitrust Division gener-
ally, rather than just what occurred during my relatively brief tenure.
10 "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect
of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate
or foreign commerce is illegal per se." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 223 (1940). This message has been repeatedly re-emphasized. See, e.g., Citizen Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 135 (1969); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265, 276 (1942).
" See A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 59 (4th ed. 1850).
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Sherman Act was passed 114 years later to deal with price fixing
and other offenses. Thirty-seven years after its enactment, the
famous Trenton Potteries case 12 resolved any doubt as to the per se
illegality of price fixing.
We also know what a typical Sherman Act section 1 civil case
looks like: a case against restrictive membership rules, 1 3 a merger
case,14 a case against a patent pool or patent misuse,' 5 a tie-in
case,' 6 a territorial case,17 or a case against information exchanges
that restrict competition. 18 Such cases may involve a full factual
inquiry under the rule of reason,' 9 or may be subject to one of the
"soft core" per se rules (such as the tie-in prohibition or the non-
coercive boycott rule).2" What differentiates civil cases from crimi-
12 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). The Supreme Court's
decision in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), created some
confusion concerning the continued vitality of Trenton Potteries. The distressed conditions of
the Great Depression, however, obviously influenced the result in Appalachian Coals. Seven
years later, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the Court
fully reestablished the Trenton Potteries rule.
1 3 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
14 See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
16See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
17 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); White Mo-
tor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).18 See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
19 The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may sup-
press or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
20 Under the traditional Sherman Act learning, two categories of cases exist: (1) those
involving per se prohibitions, applied without regard to surrounding facts; and (2) those
involving "rule of reason" inquiries which require a complete examination of all relevant
surrounding facts. The Supreme Court has greatly expanded the number of situations to
which the per se label applies. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
This has created a practical problem for the courts, as per se rules have been extended to
conduct which at least sometimes enhances competition.
As a result, I suggest, the courts have in fact recognized three working categories. The
first I call "hard core" per se cases-involving straight price fixing and market allocations.
Here the per se concept applies strictly, creating a bright-line prohibition against the activ-
ity without regard to surrounding circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The second category includes what I call "soft core" per se
cases. Here the court takes a general look at the conduct nominally subject to a per se
prohibition and its surrounding circumstances. If it finds the scheme anti-competitive, it
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nal cases is that in civil cases the challenged conduct generally has
less serious competitive impact, does not involve outright preda-
tion, and sometimes is subject to more flexible legal standards.
Of course the two statutes overlap. Some conduct is close
enough to the hard-core area that one prosecutor might responsi-
bly prosecute it as criminal, while another would seek only a civil
remedy. Similarly, there are long unchallenged categories of con-
duct that, although properly regarded as "criminal," may warrant
only a civil suit initially because of the need to provide fair notice
to those affected. How the Department of Justice proceeds in this
middle area-the area of overlap between the civil and criminal
statutes-is important to the public and challenging to the de-
cisionmakers.
Decisions of the Antitrust Division regarding the proper form
of proceeding have been criticized as arbitrary. But in my experi-
ence they are not, except in the sense that many honest judgment
calls are inevitably so when the question posed is very close.21 At
pronounces the conduct illegal per se. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). Courts tend to apply "soft core" per se rules to various vertical
arrangements and noncoercive boycotts, and to various aspects of joint ventures. Where
the court finds the challenged arrangement to be pro-competitive or potentially pro-
competitive, it will tend to define the conduct out of the per se category so as to subject it
to a "rule of reason" inquiry. See, e.g., Worthern Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bank-
Americard Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973) (reversing district court holding that joint
venture membership restriction constituted "boycott" and hence per se illegal). The third
general category comprises traditional "rule of reason" cases, in which all facts are relevant.
See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
The Supreme Court seems to have rejected any attempt to create an explicit middle
category. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the government
argued for a rule of "presumptive illegality" for certain types of vertical territorial restric-
tions, comparable to existing categorizations in the merger area. Brief for the United States
at 41, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). The Court rejected
this argument because it had not been argued below (388 U.S. at 374 n.5) and imposed a
per se prohibition on territorial restrictions in sale-resale arrangements. Ten years later the
Court reversed its position on the per se illegality of territorial restraints. Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See generally Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times
of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537, 543-49 (1975).
21 In each case, the decision to bring an indictment on a civil case is based on an
elaborate memorandum (normally running several hundred pages) prepared by the trial
staff in conjunction with their section chief and recommending a particular course of con-
duct. The memorandum and recommendation are reviewed by the Office of Operation (see
note 39 infra). That office prepares its own recommendation (normally in a memorandum
of 10-20 pages) and makes appropriate provisions in the draft proceedings. This material
is then reviewed in detail by the Chief Deputy Assistant Attorney General who in turn
makes a recommendation to the Assistant Attorney General. Thus the decision to bring a
criminal or civil case is based on an extensive analysis of the issues and the facts by both
junior and senior officials in the Antitrust Division.
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any rate, the area of overlap is small: most criminal antitrust cases
involve hard-core price fixing and market allocations in which the
defendants have clear notice and the Department has no responsi-
ble choice except to proceed by criminal indictment (or informa-
tion in a misdemeanor case).22 Those are the cases that Congress
surely had in mind when it provided for expanded fines and jail
sanctions for Sherman Act violations.
Several key points that emerged during the last twenty years
accentuate the dual nature of the Sherman Act. First, the general-
ity of the "civil" Sherman Act today raises serious questions con-
cerning its constitutionality as a criminal statute.2 3 Second, the De-
partment of Justice has in recent years enforced the "criminal"
Sherman Act so as to give defendants due notice of what it regards
as within the Act's criminal prohibitions. And third, a criminal case
against a clear civil violation (such as a noncoercive tie-in) would, in
my opinion, be subject to criticism as an abuse of prosecutorial
discretion.24 All these facts point to the same conclusion: through
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and implicit judicial recog-
nition of two different sets of rules, the single statute passed by
Congress in 1890 has come to function as two statutes. Congress
recently emphasized the Sherman Act's dual role by making "crim-
inal" violations felonies and thereby introducing realistic deterrents
to hard-core business restraints. 5
22 The new felony standards (see note 4 supra) came into effect on December 21, 1974.
The Antitrust Division's practice is to indict for felony any individual or corporation in-
volved significantly in a conspiracy after that date. If the particular defendant's conspirato-
rial activities occurred entirely in the pre-December 21, 1974 period, the Antitrust Division
will return a misdemeanor indictment or information. It is therefore plausible that a given
investigation of multiple parties will result in both felony and misdemeanor prosecutions.
22 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971). In 1913,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Sherman Act's misdemeanor provi-
sions in the face of a "void for vagueness" challenge. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373,
376-78 (1913). The same challenge has recently been renewed in the context of the offense
being upgraded to a felony; again the vagueness argument was rejected. United States v.
Jack Foley Realty, Inc., [1977-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,678 (D. Md. July 29, 1977). Both
Nash and Jack Foley dealt with price-fixing situations where the Sherman Act prohibition is
not realistically vulnerable to vagueness challenges.
24 Public confidence is vital to the law enforcement process. Where prosecutorial deci-
sions appear random and erratic, the public is more likely to regard prosecution as a game
rather than a serious undertaking. Even if an Assistant Attorney General could obtain a
felony indictment against a noncoercive tie-in, and this exercise of discretion could not be
overturned as a mattter of law, such a decision would surely deserve public criticism as a
flagrant abuse of the responsibility entrusted to the Department of Justice.
25 The prior $50,000 fine was increased to $1 million for corporations and $100,000
for other persons. The maximum jail sentence was increased from one year to three years.
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PATTERNS OF PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICE
Over the years, the Sherman Act has been viewed alternatively
as primarily a civil or criminal statute. This checkered history ac-
counts in large part for the current prosecutorial practice of using
section 1 in both criminal and civil actions.
Originally, the Department of Justice viewed the statute as es-
sentially civil, and, except in a handful of labor cases involving
violence, used section 1 to obtain equitable relief.26 Thus, from
1890 to 1903 the Justice Department instituted sixteen civil cases
and only seven criminal cases under section 1.27
Fifty years after its enactment, the Sherman Act assumed a
new role. Under Thurman Arnold's leadership, the Antitrust Divi-
sion used section I primarily to pursue criminal prosecutions. This
shift in focus reflected Arnold's philosophy:
As a deterrent, criminal prosecution is the only effective in-
strument under existing statutes.... [I]f there were teeth in the
civil remedy, it might be a deterrent. But for this purpose the
civil injunction is little more than a form of unemployment relief
for lawyers since it carries no penalties.
The civil suit has a useful place as a supplement to the crim-
inal proceeding-not as a substitute. 28
Thus, between 1938 and 1943 the Antitrust Division, under Ar-
nold, brought approximately 340 section 1 cases, 231 of which were
criminal prosecutions. 29 Although some of these cases involved
simple, old-fashioned price-fixing conspiracies, others raised nov-
el issues concerning industries generally thought exempt from the
antitrust laws. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,30
for example, was originally brought as a criminal case, despite con-
siderable question as to whether the insurance transactions chal-
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).
26See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION 596-97 (1955). See generally Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act: Early
Administration, 68 YALE L.J. 464 (1959).
27 Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 385 (1970).
28 Arnold, Antitrust Law Enforcement, Past and Future, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 5, 16
(1940).
29 These figures were compiled from CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS WITH
SUMMARY OF CASES INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED STATES 1890-1951, at 179-307 (1952). See
generally Posner, supra note 27, at 385.
30 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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lenged were in interstate commerce or even subject to the antitrust
laws. 31
Thurman Arnold clearly went beyond present standards of
due process. His actions invited criticism that businesses were
branded as criminals on the basis of uncertain conduct and unpre-
dictable rules. The Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws addressed this very point in 1955, em-
phasizing the complexity of the modern economy:
Thus, it may be difficult for today's businessman to tell in ad-
vance whether projected actions will run afoul of the Sherman
Act's criminal strictures. With this hazard in mind, we believe
that criminal process should be used only where the law is clear
and the facts reveal a flagrant offense and plain intent unreason-
ably to restrain trade.3 2
Arnold's standard goes too far in one direction, but this state-
ment goes too far in the other. Criminal prosecution should not be
limited to "a flagrant offense" or require "plain intent."
In 1955, the Antitrust Division drew the line somewhere be-
tween the two views expressed above:
In general, the following types of offenses are prosecuted
criminally: (1) price fixing; (2) other violations of the Sherman
Act where there is proof of a specific intent to restrain trade or
to monopolize; (3) a less easily defined category of cases which
might generally be described as involving proof of use of preda-
tory practices (boycotts, for example) to accomplish the objective
of the combination or conspiracy; (4) the fact that a defendant
has previously been convicted of or adjudged to have been, vio-
lating the antitrust laws may warrant indictment for a second
offense. There are other factors taken into account in determin-
ing whether to seek an indictment in cases that may not fall
precisely in any of these categories. The Division feels free to
seek an indictment in any case where a prospective defendant
has knowledge that practices similar to those in which he is en-
gaging have been held to be in violation of the Sherman Act in a
prior civil suit against other persons.33
31 Cf. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869) (issuing insurance policy not
transaction in interstate commerce).
32REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAws 349 (1955).33 d. at 350 (statement of Stanley N. Barnes, Ass't Att'y Gen. in Charge of Antitrust
1978]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Far less than a complete and detailed explanation, this state-
ment provided little guidance in close cases. Fortunately, the crimi-
nal enforcement versus civil enforcement issue was of limited prac-
tical importance during the 1950's and 1960's when the Antitrust
Division's criminal enforcement program was less extensive than it
is now. The Antitrust Division, however, continued to ponder the
dual nature of the Sherman Act and in 1967 once again sum-
marized its position:
The solution of the Antitrust Division to this problem of poten-
tial unfairness has been to lay down the firm rule that criminal
prosecutions will be recommended to the Attorney General only
against willful violations of the law, and that one of two condi-
tions must appear to be shown to establish willfulness. First, if the
rules of law alleged to have been violated are clear and
established-describing per se offenses-willfulness will be pre-
sumed. The most common criminal violation of the antitrust laws
is price fixing; upwards of 80 percent of the criminal cases filed
charge conspiracies to fix prices. The Supreme Court held more
than 30 years ago that price fixing was a per se violation of the
law--one for which no justification or defense could be offered.
. . . Second, if the acts of the defendants show intentional
violations-if through circumstantial evidence or direct testimony
it appears that the defendants knew they were violating the law
or were acting with flagrant disregard for the legality of their
conduct-willfulness will be presumed. 34
I find that statement still fair and useful today.
II
WHERE WE STAND TODAY
The criminal-versus-civil issue has increased in importance in
the last few years. The Antitrust Division now devotes a larger
share of its resources to criminal enforcement than it has at any
time since Thurman Arnold's administration.3 5 It applies a more
3 4 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 110 (1967) (footnote
omitted).
35 On May 5, 1977, while still Assistant Attorney General, I reported to Congress:
[T]he Division has over 100 grand jury investigations in progress. This is an af-
firmative choice, designed to make maximum use of the increased deterrent im-
pact of the Sherman Act felony sanctions enacted by Congress in December 1974.
Consequently, there has been a 30 percent increase in the number of pending
[Vol. 63:405
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liberal policy for initiating grand juries than it did a decade ago, 36
and now has well over one hundred grand jury investigations
pending.
The decision to open a grand jury is not a determination that
all cases recommended for prosecution by the grand jury will be
treated as criminal cases. The Division initiates a grand jury inves-
tigation when there is some reason to believe that a criminal viola-
tion may have taken place. Such a standard inevitably results in
authorization of grand jury investigations which in fact lead to civil
suits rather than criminal prosecutions. The ultimate decision to
proceed criminally, civilly, or not at all must await the conclusion
of each investigation. The broad powers of civil discovery granted
the Antitrust Division under the Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, 3 7 remove any need or temptation to convene grand juries to
promote civil investigations. 8 The decision to authorize a grand
jury investigation is made primarily by the Office of Operations,39
based upon what it already knows and what it expects to discover
about a given case.
antitrust grand juries over the pre-felony period. In fiscal year 1976, almost 2,000
attorney-days were spent in grand jury investigations.
Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977) (statement of Donald I.
Baker, Ass't Att'y Gen. in Charge of Antitrust Div.) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hear-
ings].
36 The standard today is whether a potential investigation might result in a criminal
indictment; if so, the grand jury investigation is usually used and the final decision whether
to bring a criminal or civil case is left until the completion of the investigation. In the
1960's, the standard was whether the investigation probably would produce a criminal in-
dictment.
37 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-435, §§ 101-
106, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-1314 (West Supp. 1977)).
3 Cf. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (grand jury not
"short cut to goals otherwise barred or more difficult to reach").
'9 The Office of Operations . . . is the focal point of review of all the Division's
investigations and litigation. It consists of two senior people-the Director of Op-
erations and his Deputy-supported by three assistants and a small support staff.
This office supervises the assignment, opening and closing of investigations. It
conducts [the Antitrust Division's] liaison activities with the FTC under the clear-
ance procedure. It reviews every proposel [sic] civil and criminal case recom-
mended by any section . . . . Operations is the key reviewer of immunity orders
and CID's, both of which must be ultimately signed by the AAG [Assistant Attor-
ney General].
Oversight Hearings, supra note 35, at 336. The Director of Operations is traditionally the
highest career official in the Division and he directly supervises the operations of the five
main litigating sections in Washington, the eight field offices spread around the country,
and the various smaller litigation units.
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The Assistant Attorney General must ultimately decide wheth-
er to bring a criminal prosecution. He bases that choice in part
upon articulated principles, in part upon intuition gained from
experience, and ultimately upon the facts of the particular case.
Let me tell you how I made that decision during my tenure
as Assistant Attorney General. I believe, as Thurman Arnold be-
lieved, that criminal sanctions provide the best mechanism for
dealing with price fixing, market allocation, and clearly predatory
conduct. Criminal sanctions, particularly substantial individual jail
sentences, best deter antitrust crimes.40 Accordingly, I opted for
criminal prosecutions in price-fixing and market-allocation cases,
absent any of four special mitigating factors: (1) confusion of the
law; (2) truly novel issues of law or fact; (3) confusion caused by
past prosecutorial decisions; or (4) clear evidence that the defen-
dants did not appreciate the consequences of their actions.
A. Confusion of the Law
In various areas of the economy, there is collusive conduct that
would be clearly illegal-and indeed criminal-but for the presence
of government regulation or some other arguable antitrust exemp-
tion. Where some form of regulatory umbrella exists, I generally
believe we should test the scope of any exemption it may provide
by civil rather than criminal enforcement. Such an approach is
both fairer to the defendant and more conducive to reasoned
analysis by the courts. In other words, I would not do what Thur-
man Arnold did in South-Eastern Underwriters-test a long-assumed
Sherman Act exemption by bringing a criminal case.
The Antitrust Division has followed such a policy in recent
years in "regulatory" and "state action" cases. For example, the New
York Stock Exchange fixed commission system was an ancient and
classic form of cartel rate making. When the Antitrust Division first
focused on this practice in 1968, fixed rates had been in effect for
more than 170 years, at least thirty of them under the benevolent
eye of the Securities and Exchange Commission. We.believed that
the practice was illegal under the antitrust laws because it did not
satisfy the standard for exemption announced in Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange.41 The Antitrust Division chose to proceed against
40 See Baker, To Make the Penalty Fit the Crime: How To Sentence Antitrust Felons
(Nov. 20, 1976) (remarks before the Tenth New England Antitrust Conference, Boston,
Mass.), reprinted in [1976] ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 790, at D-1 (Nov. 23, 1976).
41 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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the fixed rates by triggering SEC hearings42 and by intervening in
a private treble-damage case which was about to go to trial under a
favorable Court of Appeals mandate. 43 We did not consider-and I
would not consider-a criminal prosecution in that situation.
Of course, once the scope of the exemption is defined, a crim-
inal case would be appropriate. Today brokerage rate fixing is
clearly illegal under the Securities and Exchange Act Amendments
of 1975; 44 it is therefore per se illegal under the antitrust laws. It
would now be appropriate to proceed by grand jury investigation
and to bring indictments against anybody engaged in such rate
fixing.
B. Truly Novel Issues of Law and Fact
Criminal proceedings seem less appropriate where the De-
partment's theory of antitrust liability is entirely new. Criminal in-
dictments, particularly felony indictments, in such cases raise im-
portant issues of fairness which in turn may affect the likelihood of
obtaining a conviction. The recently filed amendments to the Gen-
eral Electric and Westinghouse consent decrees45 illustrate the consid-
erations raised by cases posing new issues. The government alleged
that GE and Westinghouse engaged in indirect price communica-
tion and signaling.46 Information was communicated in public
which established a body of data sufficient to enable each firm to
identify the price that the other firm would quote on any given
turbine generator. At the same time, the companies adopted policy
42 See Comments of the United States Department of Justice (Apr. 1, 1968), reprinted in
1 J. GROSSMAN & S. GLENDON, SECURITIES MARKET REGULATION: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 105 (1975), which led to the Commission's opening of In re
Commission Rate Structure of Registered Nat'l Sec. Exch., SEC File No. 44-144 (1968).
The Department's position was amplified and its evidence summarized in the Memoran-
dum of the United States Dep't of Justice on the Fixed Minimum Commission Rates Struc-
ture (Jan. 17, 1969), reprinted in J. GROSSMAN & S. GLENDON, supra at 222.
" Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 994 (1971).
"' Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 6(e)(1), 89 Stat. 97
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(e) (Supp. V 1975)).
"' United States v. General Elec. Co., [1977-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,660 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 19, 1977), modifying [1962] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 70,488 (E.D. Pa.); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1977-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,661 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1977),
modifying [1962] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 70,503 (E.D. Pa.).
46 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of a Proposed Modification of the Final Judg-
ment Entered on October 1, 1962 Against Each Defendant, United States v. General Elec.
Co., [1977-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 61,660 (Sept. 19, 1977); United States v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., [1977-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,661 (Sept. 19, 1977), reprinted in 42 Fed. Reg.
17,004, 17,006-07 (1977).
1978]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
positions that had the effect, and allegedly the purpose, of assur-
ing each seller that the other would adhere to the formula price.
The government viewed this as a case of "avoidable cooperation, 47
rather than simply unavoidable "conscious parallelism. 48
Given the unusual nature of that case, I did not and would not
choose to proceed criminally. As far as I know, criminal prosecu-
tion was never considered in the course of this investigation-
either during my tenure or during that of my predecessor. That
the conduct involved might be labeled "price fixing" is not deter-
minative of the mode of proceeding where the case involves novel
conduct. In fact, the best remedy I saw for this particular
phenomenon was an injunctive order preventing the firms from
continuing their pattern of price signaling and response. The re-
lief, originally included in a draft civil complaint, was ultimately
implemented as a modification of outstanding consent decrees for
reasons explained in the government's memorandum.49
C. Confusion Caused by Prior Prosecutorial Action
The third situation in which a civil action may provide the
appropriate enforcement procedure for what might be regarded as
criminal conduct occurs when a proposed case represents a depar-
ture from past practices of the Department of Justice. For example,
I would not feel bound by a prior Business Review letter 5 0 -
especially an old one-when the letter was based on what now
would be regarded as incorrect analysis or policy. Yet such a
changed position should not be unveiled in a criminal indictment.
Rather a civil suit should be brought to "fire a shot across their
bow." Having made its new position clear, the Department could
proceed criminally in the future.
Years of prosecutorial acquiescence in longstanding open con-
duct may create a similar situation. For example, the Antitrust
Division long tolerated "recommended" fee schedules by bar as-
sociations, although such schedules had the clear purpose and
necessary effect of stabilizing prices for legal services. When the
Division decided to prosecute such schedules as illegal, it initiated a
47 Id. at 17,006-09.
18 Id. at 17,007.
49 Id. at 17,009.
50 The Antitrust Division's Business Review Procedure is set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 50.6
(1976). Generally, it provides that an applicant can obtain a statement of the government's
"present endorsement intention" with respect to a particular live transaction fully disclosed
to the government. Normally, the request for such a ruling, the ruling itself, and the sup-
porting documentation are made public. See id.
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civil suit against the Oregon State Bar.51 This suit was followed by
the Supreme Court's decision holding such fee schedules illegal
under the antitrust laws. 52 Having once given the professions full
and adequate warning, the Justice Department may now take a
more aggressive posture. In the future, it would be appropriate to
proceed criminally against this type of scheme.
D. Clear Evidence the Defendants Did Not Appreciate the
Consequences of Their Actions
Occasionally defendants engage in per se price fixing, but
their conduct clearly indicates that they had no idea they were
violating the antitrust laws. There may, for instance, have been
open and widely advertised public meetings among a group of
naive businessmen without an antitrust counsel. An illustrative case
arose a few years ago when a group of local gasoline dealers in a
western state made public announcements calling for meetings to
stabilize prices and eliminate price wars. I would normally regard
such conduct as entirely indictable.53 Yet the naive innocence of the
exceptionally unsophisticated may deserve some weight in pros-
ecutorial judgment. Although a showing of specific intent is not
required to establish a price-fixing violation,5 4 prosecutors recog-
"' United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).
52 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
" See, e.g., United States v. Wholesale Tobacco Distribs., Inc., No. 77 Cr. 131 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Feb. 17, 1977) (allegedly illegal conduct took place at publicly announced association
meetings). I reject the suggestion that the Antitrust Division should proceed civilly in price-
fixing conspiracies of limited economic impact, such as those involving a small industry or
local market. Resources are limited, and the Department of Justice cannot discover, inves-
tigate, and prosecute every small, local price fixer. But once the decision to proceed against
a local price-fixing conspiracy has been made, the same standards should apply as would
be applicable to a larger conspiracy. I firmly believe that price fixing by a local service firm
is as much a criminal violation as price fixing by a national manufacturer. See Baker, Anti-
trust Enforcement in the Service Sector (Sept. 15, 1976) (remarks to Wash. State Bar Ass'n,
Antitrust Section) (on file at the Cornell Law Review). The service sector today accounts for
one-third of the United States' GNP. The Antitrust Division is currently putting more re-
sources into antitrust enforcement in the service sector to match changes in the economy,
and criminal indictments should be used against price fixing and other hard-core restraints
by local service firms. See, e.g., United States v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc., [1977-2] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 61,678 (D. Md. July 29, 1977) (indictment of Montgomery County, Md. real estate
brokers).
.4 Normally it is stated that "[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price
of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1943) (emphasis added). However, in fact, "[p]urpose
and effect are disjunctively linked in antitrust analysis, both under the rule of reason and
in the application of the per se doctrine. If the purpose or (assuming a very different and in-
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nize that a judge or jury might be disinclined to convict under such
circumstances. The violator's naivet6 is, however, a much less com-
pelling consideration than the other three I have mentioned.
CONCLUSION
The Antitrust Division's increased use of grand jury investiga-
tions makes its choice of whether to proceed against violators with
civil or criminal actions a matter of growing practical importance to
the business community and the bar. Close cases will remain close
and they will not go away. It necessarily follows that with very close
cases decisions could go either way. Articulation and consistent
application of principles for deciding the form of proceeding give
parties some notice of the standards to which their conduct will be
held. Ultimately, however, these hard choices require judgment
calls by the Assistant Attorney General. All we can ask is that in
making such calls he be fair, candid, and dispassionate. Only then
can he hope to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the
antitrust enforcement process.
nocent purpose) if the predictable effect of conduct is to fix prices (or achieve anything else
held per se unlawful) the conduct runs afoul of the per se rule. Similarly, if either the pur-
pose or effect of a practice evaluated under the rule of reason is sufficiently adverse to
competition to outweigh any benefits, the conduct is deemed unreasonable." L. SULLIVAN,
HANDaOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 71, at 194 (1977).
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